CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on
Tuesday, 6 September 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Sirous Nasseri (Islamic Republic of Iran)

GE.94-64316 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 691st plenary meeting of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

Before I give them the floor, and as I informed you at our last plenary meeting, we shall take up for adoption, today, the reports of the Ad Hoc Committees on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Transparency in Armaments and Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.

Mr. BAIDI-NEJAD (Islamic Republic of Iran): On behalf of the delegations of Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and my own country, I have the honour to make the following statement.

Paragraph 20 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament underscores the importance of effective measures of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war as deserving the highest priority among measures of arms limitation and disarmament. The document, in paragraph 32, reaffirmed also the need for effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

Following the demise of the cold war, dramatic positive changes have taken place in the international political climate. As a consequence, the world has witnessed the arrangement of a number of significant arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The precedent of the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the beginning of a process of nuclear disarmament by the United States and Russian Federation, and the measures taken by other former Soviet republics in the framework of complete nuclear disarmament demonstrate clearly that nuclear disarmament is not only within the frame of practical implementation but can also be achieved in the foreseeable future if only the political will exists. Apparently, less reliance is now being placed by nuclear-weapon States on the role of nuclear weapons. The process of de-emphasizing this role and reducing the dependence upon them should be continued and carried forward as a significant step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Non-aligned Conference recently held in Cairo reiterated the belief that, in order to be effective and lasting, the approach towards international security should be non-discriminatory and balanced and should seek security for all through total nuclear disarmament, elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and progressive measures of reduction of conventional arms. The Conference restated that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States can contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the

(Mr. Baidi-Nejad, Islamic Republic of Iran)

presence of nuclear weapons and urged the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate, as a matter of priority, an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and to undertake negotiations for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

Accordingly, the members of the Group of 21 already parties to the NPT attach utmost importance to both questions of negative and positive security assurances. It is their conviction that the only completely effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lie in a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and a complete elimination of these weapons. Existence of nuclear weapons constitutes in itself a threat to international security and a factor which encourages proliferation. For this reason, and pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures and arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against these weapons, measures and arrangements which can contribute positively towards achieving a most effective regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects.

In this respect, the above-mentioned delegations wish to present to the Conference a draft protocol on security assurances which would be attached to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as its integral part. They are confident that the protocol drafted on the basis of a simple common formula (i.e. the nuclear-weapon States pledge themselves never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States), would be given early and serious consideration by the members of the Conference. The text of the protocol is annexed to my statement.

In conclusion, let me request on behalf of the above-mentioned delegations that this statement be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. I should now like to give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, who will introduce the report of that Committee, which reflects the status of the negotiations up to 5 September and is contained in the document before you, in English, CD/1273/Rev.1.

Mr. MARÍN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, I have the honour to submit to the Conference the revised report by the Committee which is to be found in document CD/1273/Rev.1. As you will recall, last Thursday I had the honour to introduce the Ad Hoc Committee's report and now I am presenting its first revised edition which, as the President has just said, contains the changes made in the negotiations held between 24 August and yesterday, when the Committee approved the document in question. May I say that the alterations by comparison with last week's report are very few and are basically to be found under the following headings: status of the protocols, page 27; preamble, pages 30 and 31; various parts of the section on

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

verification, that is, pages 62 through 69, and, concerning footnotes, a series of changes agreed to in the past few days. I have the impression that this document could be approved by the Conference in the plenary we shall be holding tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban for the presentation of his report and, as you suggested, at our next plenary meeting tomorrow on 7 September, we will take up this report for adoption and it is my understanding that this will be done on the basis of the English text. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Detect and Identify Seismic Events to present the progress report of the Group on its 39th session, as contained in document CD/1270 and Corrigendum 1.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I will today report to you on the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts held from 8 to 19 August 1994 and introduce the Group's progress report contained in document CD/1270 and Corr.1. The Group's session was attended by experts and representatives from 33 countries.

The session was devoted to finalizing the planning of the Group's third Technical Test, which we refer to as GSETT-3. This test is a joint effort to develop, test and evaluate new concepts for an experimental International Seismic Monitoring System. A report summarizing the overall concept of GSETT-3, its functions and components and matters of organization and cost was presented to the CD on 2 June 1994 as document CD/1254.

The main conclusion of the recent session is that the Ad Hoc Group, after reviewing the planning situation, decided to go ahead with GSETT-3 as planned and to start the full-scale testing by 1 January 1995. The Group recognizes that not all of the seismological stations envisaged for participation will be ready to provide data by 1 January, but the Group nevertheless considers that the number of stations already committed, or expected to be committed during the remainder of 1994, will permit full-scale testing of the system by 1 January.

The Group's elaboration was based on draft GSETT-3 documentation containing operational manuals for the experimental International Data Centre and participating stations and plans for the evaluation of the results and experiences. These extensive documents, comprising more than 500 pages, were prepared by the three working groups earlier established by the Group. I would like to recognize the important work carried out by the working groups under the guidance of the three convenors: Mr. Mykkeltveit of Norway, responsible for planning, Mr. Muirhead of Australia, responsible for operations, and Mr. Massinon of France, responsible for evaluation. Status reports from the three working groups are annexed to the progress report.

The planning of GSETT-3 and the preparation of the draft documentation was greatly facilitated by an informal workshop on preparations for GSETT-3 convened in Alexandria, Virginia, United States of America from 25 to 29 April 1994 and attended by 28 participants from 12 countries.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The Group agreed that the reviewed and amended operational manuals and other planning documents have to be revised by the working groups as the detailed planning is proceeding. A modern electronic information handling system has been implemented to provide all GSETT-3 participants with the most current information on-line.

The issue of the duration of the test has been raised several times also outside the Group of Scientific Experts. The Ad Hoc Group discussed the issue, but finds it difficult to give any precise indication of the duration of GSETT-3. The Group therefore reiterates its earlier view that for financial planning purposes, countries participating in GSETT-3 should be prepared to support their participation for a minimum of one year after the start of the full-scale experiment, which means for the whole of 1995.

The Group reviewed the current status of participation. Annex 1 to the progress report and the corrigendum lists those countries which so far have committed Alpha and Beta stations and Gamma data. Gamma data are supplementary seismic information provided by National Data Centres on a voluntary basis to be used in the evaluation of GSETT-3. Annex 1 also lists countries from which commitments are still lacking. As for the Alpha stations, which primarily are determining the detection capability of the system, 38 stations in 17 countries are currently committed out of the 59 stations in 35 countries specified for the Alpha network.

As for the Beta stations, the Group has received information from 30 countries on plans to contribute data from, in all, 93 Beta stations, out of which 76 stations in 22 countries have already been committed. The Beta stations are primarily used to improve the location of seismic events detected by the Alpha network and data are retrieved automatically by the experimental International Data Centre using electronic means when needed. The Group has recommended that at least 100 Beta stations be used in GSETT-3. While 93 planned Beta stations might look quite close to the anticipated 100, the geographical distribution of the Beta stations so far available is most uneven.

Even if participation has increased substantially the last few months - and the Group has good reasons to believe that further commitments are to be expected soon, there is still a strong need to ensure commitment from remaining Alpha stations and to obtain an adequate global coverage of Beta stations. Most of the stations needed are in fact in operation today and many are connected to international data exchange channels. What we are lacking is the formal consent to utilize data from those stations in GSETT-3. I have, on behalf of the Group, approached a number of countries to seek such formal approval and I urge your support in getting the necessary commitments.

In some other cases there is a need to establish new or upgrade existing stations or to establish and finance necessary communication links between a station and the experimental International Data Centre. The Group recognizes that a country whose participation is essential to GSETT-3 might need support in this respect, and the Group encourages other countries to assist by providing technical and financial support.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The experimental International Data Centre (EIDC), now being established in Arlington, Virginia, United States of America, is a key facility for GSETT-3. The Group noted with great satisfaction the rapid progress in developing and conducting operations at the Experimental International Data Centre. To establish and operate the Experimental International Data Centre is a substantial undertaking, technically and financially. The IDC staff today amounts to 30 persons, a number that will increase to 45 by 1 January. International staffing of the Experimental International Data Centre is an important objective, and during the Group's session some 10 qualified international applicants were selected.

The Experimental International Data Centre is up and running and today receives data routinely from 12 Alpha and some 20 Beta stations. It receives more than one billion data units (bytes)/day, corresponding to about half a million pages per day, and locates on the average 20 seismic events each day. When the full-scale testing begins in January it is expected that the centre will receive 10 times more data and define and locate 10 times more seismic events. The flexible software at the Experimental International Data Centre also makes it possible to compute and provide a number of different parameters to facilitate the evaluation of the IDC products.

A thorough evaluation is an essential element of GSETT-3 and the Group has established a plan for an extensive evaluation process in which individual countries contribute through their National Data Centres. The evaluation will cover the functions and the technical systems at stations and at the Experimental International Data Centre and the procedures for exchanging, handling and analysing data. It will also include a careful review of the operational manuals in light of the practical experiences gained. The capability of the system to detect and locate seismic events and to provide further information on reported events will also be evaluated.

The Group discussed a proposal for cooperation with the scientific community and concluded that such cooperation is and will remain essential. The Group agreed to provide the data collected during GSETT-3 to the scientific community in a suitable manner and at a suitable time.

GSETT-3 has now left the planning stage and is gradually developing into a full-scale phase when an experimental global system is up and running. This test will not only involve a lot of technical facilities around the world, it will also involve hundreds of people in many countries who now will work hard and cooperate closely to make GSETT-3 a successful undertaking. We are now dependant on their skill and dedication and on the support they get from their countries and their authorities to conduct their important work.

The evaluation of GSETT-3 has started and is a continuous process. The Group expects that the first preliminary results from the full experimental system will be available soon after the full-scale phase has commenced. The Group therefore suggests that subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, its next session should be convened from 20 February to 3 March 1995. The main task during that session will be to review, evaluate and report on initial results from the full-scale phase of GSETT-3.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Dr. Dahlman for the presentation of this report and would ask if the recommendation contained in paragraph 19 of the report, to the effect that the next meeting of the Ad Hoc Group be convened from 20 February to 3 March 1995, is acceptable to the Conference. I see no comments.

It is so decided.

Before proceeding to the adoption of the reports on the Ad Hoc Committees on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Transparency in Armaments and NSA, as contained in documents CD/1271, CD/1274, CD/1275 respectively, I wish to draw your attention to the fact that, at our informal plenary meeting held on Thursday, 1 September, in the course of the consideration of the technical parts of the draft annual report (CD/WP.456), we agreed that the final paragraphs contained in the reports of each Ad Hoc Committee, which are currently bracketed, would be deleted and that a new paragraph would be inserted into Section J of CD/WP.456, entitled "Consideration and adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and any other Report as Appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations" and that that paragraph would read as follows:

> "The Conference recognized that in 1995 it would have a number of urgent and important areas for negotiation, which would be likely to draw heavily on its time and resources. It therefore recommended that the balance of future work be considered more fully by the Conference before it decides which Ad Hoc Committees, besides the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, should be established in 1995. The Conference also requested the current President and the incoming President to remain seized of these issues and conduct appropriate consultations during the intersessional period in order to come up with recommendations that would ensure the prompt and effective start of the work of its 1995 session on substantive issues."

May I take it that this agreement, reached in an informal meeting on 1 September, can be formalized here today?

It is so decided.

I therefore, now put to you for adoption, without the final bracketed paragraph and also without the footnote, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, as contained in document CD/1271. I see no comments.

It is so decided.

I now put to the Conference, for adoption, without the final bracketed paragraph, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments (document CD/1274). I see no comments.

It is so decided.

(The President)

I now put to the Conference, for adoption, again without the final bracketed paragraph, and without the footnote, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. I note in this regard the request of the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the inclusion of their statement as a document that can be listed in this report. I see no comments on this.

It is so decided.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

If not, I wish to adjourn this plenary meeting and convene an informal plenary in approximately 15 minutes, no later than 11.15 a.m., to continue consideration of the draft annual report of the CD to the General Assembly, which is contained in document CD/WP.456/Rev.1.

The next, and last, plenary meeting of the session will be held tomorrow, Wednesday, 7 September 1994, at 3.00 p.m.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.